... то есть мнение Майкла Гилмора, который занимался этой проблемой, будем игнорировать...
- Кто же посмеет игнорировать мнение столь значительного и компетентного специалиста? Вот его рекомендации по результатам 2016 финансового года:
FY16 Recommendations.
1. The program should complete all necessary Block 3F baseline test points. If the program uses test data from previous testing or added complex test points to sign off some of these test points, the program must ensure the data are applicable and provide sufficient statistical confidence prior to deleting any underlying build-up test points.
2. In light of the fact that the program is unable to correct all open deficiencies prior to IOT&E, the program should assess and mitigate the cumulative effects of the many remaining SDD deficiencies on F-35 effectiveness and suitability, especially those deficiencies that, in combination or alone, may cause operational mission failures during IOT&E or in combat, prior to finalizing and fielding Block 3F. The program will need to add test points to troubleshoot and address deficiencies that are currently not resolved.
3. The program should consider developing another full version of Block 3F software to deliver to flight test in order to address more known deficiencies.
4. The program should ensure adequate resources remain available (personnel, labs, flight test aircraft) through the completion of IOT&E to develop, test, and verify corrections to deficiencies identified during flight testing.
5. The program should address the deficiency of excessive F-35C vertical oscillations during catapult launches within SDD to ensure catapult operations can be conducted safely during IOT&E and during operational carrier deployments.
6. The Program Office must immediately fund and expedite the contracting actions for the necessary hardware and software modifications to provide the necessary and adequate Block 3F mission data development capabilities for the USRL, including an adequate number of additional radio frequency signal generator channels and the other required hardware and software tools.
7. The program should address the JOTT-identified shortfalls in the USRL that prevent the lab from reacting to new threats and reprogramming mission data files consistent with the standards routinely achieved on legacy aircraft.
8. The program should correct deficiencies that are preventing completion of all of the TEMP-required Block 3F Weapons Delivery Accuracy (WDA) events and ensure the events are completed prior to finishing SDD.
9. The program should ensure Block 3F is delivered with capability to engage moving targets, such as that provided by the GBU-49, or other bombs that do not require lead-laser guidance.
10. The program should complete additional testing and analysis needed to determine the risk of pilots being harmed by the Transparency Removal System (which shatters the canopy first, allowing the seat and pilot to leave the aircraft) during ejections in other than ideal, stable conditions (such as after battle damage or during out-of-control situations). The program should complete these tests as soon as possible, with the new equipment, including the Gen III Lite helmet in a variety of off-nominal conditions, so that the Services can better assess risk associated with ejections under these “off-nominal” conditions.
11. The program needs to conduct an assessment to determine the extent to which the results of further durability testing with BH-1, the F-35B durability test article, are representative of production aircraft and, if necessary, procure another test article for the third life testing.
12. The Navy and the Program Office should investigate alternatives for determining the operational impact of an engine removal and install while conducting carrier air wing operations at sea.
13. The Navy and Marine Corps should conduct an analysis, such as an operational logistics footprint study, which simulates flight deck and hangar bay spotting (aircraft placement) with a full ACE onboard, using data from the DT-III ship trials to determine what the impact of an engine removal and installation would be on integrated ship and ACE operations with a full ACE onboard.
14. The program and the Navy should investigate if the heavy power module container should be redesigned for better usability at sea.
15. The program and the Navy should investigate potential options to improve ship-based communications bandwidth dedicated to ALIS connectivity off-ship, such as increasing the priority of ALIS transmissions, or reserving low-use times of the day for handling large volumes of ALIS message traffic.
16. The Navy should investigate any efficient, multi-use opportunities for F-35 support equipment (SE) such as using legacy SE on the F-35 or F-35 SE on legacy aircraft.
17. The Navy should investigate options for increasing the number of wall power outlets in CVN hangar bays to help facilitate simultaneous maintenance on multiple F-35Cs, or the ability to interconnect multiple pieces of support equipment from a single outlet to permit simultaneous operations.
Вот только в этих полезных рекомендациях нет абсолютно ничего, призывающего к закрытию программы F-35. Только к её интенсивному завершению.
А вот из серии "Наш ответ
Чемберлену Гилмору":
http://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/f-35a-at-red-flag-90-mission-capable-key-systems-up-every-flight/
F-35A At Red Flag: 90% Mission Capable; Key Systems Up Every Flight
By COLIN CLARKon February 14, 2017 at 4:16 PM
