Я позволю себе вернуться к Багдаду.
Прежде всего -еще раз приведу всю ссылку
Actions at Baghdad
Intelligence officers at all echelons continued to have great difficulty accurately describing the threat in the city. In the months leading up to the war, V Corps, CFLCC, and CENTCOM intelligence leaders and analysts spent the bulk of their energy trying to characterize what the Baghdad fight might look like. In October 2002, intelligence officers from the national level, CENTCOM, CFLCC, I MEF, and V Corps met and developed a common estimate of the enemy situation that they had separately continued to update.
Prior to D-day, intelligence officers estimated that no more that 9-12 company equivalents of the Republican Guard would successfully retreat into the city. They expected these units to be disorganized. According to the estimates, these remnants would report to the SRG, who were expected to stand and fight in the city. There was some reason to believe the Iraqis had developed a sophisticated and potentially effective city-defense strategy that would leverage all of the advantages of a prepared defense in an urban environment. Captured documents revealed a detailed plan to divide Baghdad into sectors and defend it in a manner reminiscent of the First Battle of Grozny. The international airport and the palace complex area in the heart of the city would be the most heavily defended sites in Baghdad. All intelligence reporting supported these assessments, indicating that the defense would crystallize around these two critical facilities. Prewar intelligence estimates noted the presence of paramilitary forces in large numbers but were vague on how these forces might operate. The march up-country effectively answered that question, painting the picture of the potentially dangerous and difficult fight to come.7
As the battle progressed, the coalition defeated but did not destroy the Republican Guard. The slew of vehicles and equipment left abandoned sparked a variety of theories about the Republican Guard’s actual condition. These ranged from the view that the Iraqis would conduct a stalwart infantry-based defense of the city with the missing Republican Guard soldiers as the bedrock to the notion of a defense by disorganized remnants. Imagery and other reports inexplicably showed almost no preparations within the city. There were numerous small fighting positions but none of the deliberate defenses that common sense and Iraqi doctrine indicated. Intelligence and field reports painted a picture of mixed units thrown haphazardly into the fray with little command and control. Intelligence officers could no longer speak with assurance about which unit was where, let alone in what strength. Some units fought, some died in place under the rain of coalition fires, and some abandoned their equipment and just walked away. But were they going home or going to ground to add to the unconventional defense of the city? It was unclear whether Baghdad was a trap, a clever ruse, or a hollow shell. When 3rd ID seized and cleared the airport, one of the two sites everyone agreed would be heavily defended, the troops answered part of the question. Baghdad looked difficult, but it did not look
335
like Grozny. Taking the airport made the armored raids—the “Thunder Runs”—feasible in the mind of the senior commanders and their staffs.8
Although Major General Blount and the 3rd ID settled into Objectives SAINTS and LIONS, they had not entirely reduced Objective TITANS. In accordance with the original plan, the division continued to set its part of the cordon. Although the rest of V Corps and I MEF continued to advance rapidly, they would not be players in the immediate actions at Baghdad. But neither Wallace nor Blount believed they needed to wait on securing TITANS or for the rest of the corps to get started. The 3rd ID would conduct raids and attacks to maintain the heat on the regime and to retain the initiative against the defending Iraqis and foreign fighters.
Thunder Runs
Given the ambiguity surrounding Baghdad, the division’s first order of business was to probe, or raid, the city, just to see what would happen. Literally sticking his hand into what everyone expected to be a “hornets’ nest,” Blount ordered Colonel Perkins’ 2nd BCT to conduct a thunder run into the city. While the thunder run on 5 April turned into a stiff fight for the Rogues of TF 1-64 AR, their success suggested that Baghdad would be defended energetically, but that the enemy no longer could mount effective resistance. Interestingly, the Hunter UAV showed the Iraqis setting obstacles behind the Rogues, apparently trying to set up kill zones if the Americans departed along the same route. The obstacles proved irrelevant since the Rogues continued on to the airport rather than retrace their route.9
Taking less than a day to assess the reaction, Wallace and Blount struck again. This time, rather than a simple one-battalion raid, the division ordered a full brigade into the heart of Baghdad. On 7 April, Colonel Perkins’ 2nd Brigade Spartans launched a second thunder run, ending up in downtown Baghdad—the absolute heart of Saddam’s regime—to demonstrate to the Iraqis and the world the Americans’ freedom to move about the city. On that day Perkins made the single decision that arguably shortened the siege by weeks, if not months—he chose to stay downtown. Equally important, McKiernan, Wallace, and Blount trusted his judgment and underwrote the risks that he took. While the fighting continued in earnest for another few days and insurgents fight on today, the second thunder run broke the regime’s back, and any remaining political or military leaders of rank disappeared in a flash of self-preservation.
Сама эта глава носит красноречивое название Коллапс режима.Как видно из написанного,американцы опасались второго Грозного,но его там не оказалось.фактически все бои,достойные этого слова,кончились в пригородах или в районе аэропорта.
О подготовке написано сами видели что showed almost no preparations within the city
Добавлено спустя 18 минут 13 секунд:
Собственно,пример Фаллуджи показывает,что покатушки с ветерком возможны только там,где нет сопротивления,а где оно есть,приходится как положено дом за домом
http://www.rusarmy.com/forum/topic5960-480.html
Штурм 4 апреля осуществлялся силами всего четырех батальонов морской пехоты. Второй штурм осуществляли две полковые боевые группы морской пехоты и бригадная боевая группа армии США, общей численностью 10.000 чел, то есть опять же сил было задействовано значительно меньше, чем в ходе штурма Багдада. Численность арабов приблизительно оценивались в 3000 чел. Атака началась 7 ноября 2004 года, 16 ноября штурм был успешно завершен. Американцы потерял 38 чел. убитыми и 275 ранеными. Защитников Фаллуджи было перебито 1200-2000 чел., в плен попало более 1000 чел. В отличие от багдадских «раскатов грома», в Фаллудже американцы зачищали город последовательно. Фаллуджа оборонялась по схеме обороны Грозного в Новогоднюю ночь, то есть защитники планировали без сопротивления пропустить американцев в центр города и пожечь их бронетехнику. Но «бездуховные пiндосы» не согласились играть в поддавки и не стали наступать по сходящимся направлениям. Вместо этого их танки, БМП и штурмовые группы последовательно прошли город сначала с севера на юг, а потом с юга на север.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Как видите,тут и тройное численное превосходство и совершенно неизмеримое превосходство в вооружениях.Кстати,версия Лаврентия довольно сильно отличается от версии Хлюстова,поэтому,опять-таки хочется посмотреть первоисточник.Надеюсь.не американский -как-никак это одна из сторон конфликта и,значит,по определению не достоверна.
Что до первого штурма -для всего мира это была победа суннитов(как собственно и было написано в одной из моих ссылок английским по белому),а то что штурм отложили по просьбе правительства Ирака слишком сильно смахивает на отмазку.Не трогайте наших суннитов,они белые и пушистые.Это при взаимной любви суннитов и шиитов.
С другой стороны,надо же было как-то объяснить остановку возмездия.
Не скажешь ведь -Мы начали операцию второпях и непродуманно,а тут еще эти поцы из Армии Махди полезли,так что сперва с ними разберемся
Прежде всего -еще раз приведу всю ссылку
Actions at Baghdad
Intelligence officers at all echelons continued to have great difficulty accurately describing the threat in the city. In the months leading up to the war, V Corps, CFLCC, and CENTCOM intelligence leaders and analysts spent the bulk of their energy trying to characterize what the Baghdad fight might look like. In October 2002, intelligence officers from the national level, CENTCOM, CFLCC, I MEF, and V Corps met and developed a common estimate of the enemy situation that they had separately continued to update.
Prior to D-day, intelligence officers estimated that no more that 9-12 company equivalents of the Republican Guard would successfully retreat into the city. They expected these units to be disorganized. According to the estimates, these remnants would report to the SRG, who were expected to stand and fight in the city. There was some reason to believe the Iraqis had developed a sophisticated and potentially effective city-defense strategy that would leverage all of the advantages of a prepared defense in an urban environment. Captured documents revealed a detailed plan to divide Baghdad into sectors and defend it in a manner reminiscent of the First Battle of Grozny. The international airport and the palace complex area in the heart of the city would be the most heavily defended sites in Baghdad. All intelligence reporting supported these assessments, indicating that the defense would crystallize around these two critical facilities. Prewar intelligence estimates noted the presence of paramilitary forces in large numbers but were vague on how these forces might operate. The march up-country effectively answered that question, painting the picture of the potentially dangerous and difficult fight to come.7
As the battle progressed, the coalition defeated but did not destroy the Republican Guard. The slew of vehicles and equipment left abandoned sparked a variety of theories about the Republican Guard’s actual condition. These ranged from the view that the Iraqis would conduct a stalwart infantry-based defense of the city with the missing Republican Guard soldiers as the bedrock to the notion of a defense by disorganized remnants. Imagery and other reports inexplicably showed almost no preparations within the city. There were numerous small fighting positions but none of the deliberate defenses that common sense and Iraqi doctrine indicated. Intelligence and field reports painted a picture of mixed units thrown haphazardly into the fray with little command and control. Intelligence officers could no longer speak with assurance about which unit was where, let alone in what strength. Some units fought, some died in place under the rain of coalition fires, and some abandoned their equipment and just walked away. But were they going home or going to ground to add to the unconventional defense of the city? It was unclear whether Baghdad was a trap, a clever ruse, or a hollow shell. When 3rd ID seized and cleared the airport, one of the two sites everyone agreed would be heavily defended, the troops answered part of the question. Baghdad looked difficult, but it did not look
335
like Grozny. Taking the airport made the armored raids—the “Thunder Runs”—feasible in the mind of the senior commanders and their staffs.8
Although Major General Blount and the 3rd ID settled into Objectives SAINTS and LIONS, they had not entirely reduced Objective TITANS. In accordance with the original plan, the division continued to set its part of the cordon. Although the rest of V Corps and I MEF continued to advance rapidly, they would not be players in the immediate actions at Baghdad. But neither Wallace nor Blount believed they needed to wait on securing TITANS or for the rest of the corps to get started. The 3rd ID would conduct raids and attacks to maintain the heat on the regime and to retain the initiative against the defending Iraqis and foreign fighters.
Thunder Runs
Given the ambiguity surrounding Baghdad, the division’s first order of business was to probe, or raid, the city, just to see what would happen. Literally sticking his hand into what everyone expected to be a “hornets’ nest,” Blount ordered Colonel Perkins’ 2nd BCT to conduct a thunder run into the city. While the thunder run on 5 April turned into a stiff fight for the Rogues of TF 1-64 AR, their success suggested that Baghdad would be defended energetically, but that the enemy no longer could mount effective resistance. Interestingly, the Hunter UAV showed the Iraqis setting obstacles behind the Rogues, apparently trying to set up kill zones if the Americans departed along the same route. The obstacles proved irrelevant since the Rogues continued on to the airport rather than retrace their route.9
Taking less than a day to assess the reaction, Wallace and Blount struck again. This time, rather than a simple one-battalion raid, the division ordered a full brigade into the heart of Baghdad. On 7 April, Colonel Perkins’ 2nd Brigade Spartans launched a second thunder run, ending up in downtown Baghdad—the absolute heart of Saddam’s regime—to demonstrate to the Iraqis and the world the Americans’ freedom to move about the city. On that day Perkins made the single decision that arguably shortened the siege by weeks, if not months—he chose to stay downtown. Equally important, McKiernan, Wallace, and Blount trusted his judgment and underwrote the risks that he took. While the fighting continued in earnest for another few days and insurgents fight on today, the second thunder run broke the regime’s back, and any remaining political or military leaders of rank disappeared in a flash of self-preservation.
Сама эта глава носит красноречивое название Коллапс режима.Как видно из написанного,американцы опасались второго Грозного,но его там не оказалось.фактически все бои,достойные этого слова,кончились в пригородах или в районе аэропорта.
О подготовке написано сами видели что showed almost no preparations within the city
Добавлено спустя 18 минут 13 секунд:
Собственно,пример Фаллуджи показывает,что покатушки с ветерком возможны только там,где нет сопротивления,а где оно есть,приходится как положено дом за домом
http://www.rusarmy.com/forum/topic5960-480.html
Штурм 4 апреля осуществлялся силами всего четырех батальонов морской пехоты. Второй штурм осуществляли две полковые боевые группы морской пехоты и бригадная боевая группа армии США, общей численностью 10.000 чел, то есть опять же сил было задействовано значительно меньше, чем в ходе штурма Багдада. Численность арабов приблизительно оценивались в 3000 чел. Атака началась 7 ноября 2004 года, 16 ноября штурм был успешно завершен. Американцы потерял 38 чел. убитыми и 275 ранеными. Защитников Фаллуджи было перебито 1200-2000 чел., в плен попало более 1000 чел. В отличие от багдадских «раскатов грома», в Фаллудже американцы зачищали город последовательно. Фаллуджа оборонялась по схеме обороны Грозного в Новогоднюю ночь, то есть защитники планировали без сопротивления пропустить американцев в центр города и пожечь их бронетехнику. Но «бездуховные пiндосы» не согласились играть в поддавки и не стали наступать по сходящимся направлениям. Вместо этого их танки, БМП и штурмовые группы последовательно прошли город сначала с севера на юг, а потом с юга на север.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Как видите,тут и тройное численное превосходство и совершенно неизмеримое превосходство в вооружениях.Кстати,версия Лаврентия довольно сильно отличается от версии Хлюстова,поэтому,опять-таки хочется посмотреть первоисточник.Надеюсь.не американский -как-никак это одна из сторон конфликта и,значит,по определению не достоверна.
Что до первого штурма -для всего мира это была победа суннитов(как собственно и было написано в одной из моих ссылок английским по белому),а то что штурм отложили по просьбе правительства Ирака слишком сильно смахивает на отмазку.Не трогайте наших суннитов,они белые и пушистые.Это при взаимной любви суннитов и шиитов.
С другой стороны,надо же было как-то объяснить остановку возмездия.
Не скажешь ведь -Мы начали операцию второпях и непродуманно,а тут еще эти поцы из Армии Махди полезли,так что сперва с ними разберемся
:aplodir: 
