Methodology was a factor in German success. No tactical concept remained
in the isolation of pure theory. The better German tacticians judged ideas
according to the actual environment in which they would be applied. Their
evaluation considered all influential factors: the condition of German forces,
the enemy situation, weapons, terrain, space, and time. No tactical concept
was a thing-in-itself with inherent strength: concepts crossed the gap from
theory to reality. For example, the counterattack was not valuable simply
because it was a “counterattack”; a counterattack would be valuable if it were
delivered at the proper time by well-trained units on known terrain against a
confused enemy. The Germans did not neglect the cause and effect relationships.
They did not lull themselves into a sense of satisfaction by simply coining
a catchword or catchphrase. Their tactics were viable principles to adapt
to the battlefield, not impressive labels to hide ignorance. It is perhaps instructive
to note that the German offensive tactics of 1918 did not receive a catchy
name until the Allies tried to give them one (which was inaccurate, anyway).The habit of considering the cause and effect relationships when developing
tactical concepts made the Germans cautious and prudent about change.
They did not advocate change for its own sake; they recommended change
When conditions demanded improvement. The Germans knew how thoroughly
change had to be imposed before it would have the desired effect. Therefore one
can understand why Lieutenant Colonel Lucas of the French Army, in his
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postwar study of tactical change, lamented that the French possessed many
valuable prewar regulations, but ignored them in the war. During the war,
French tactical change was too often exclusively a function of a single dominant
personality, as shown, for example, in the variation of French defense
organization in the spring of 1918, depending upon the individual field army
commander’s adherence to the ideas of Foch or Petain. In the British Army,
there were several examples of innovative commanders. Unfortunately, an
‘unimaginative and often unreflective High Command did not seek better tactical
solutions with sufficient determination and flexibility of mind; tactical
change for the entire BEF lacked the breadth, thoroughness, and speed which
OHL achieved under von Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Somme has provided
a clear example: the British are still remembered as the great sufferers at
the Somme, but it was the Germans who were the better learners from the
experience.The Germans treated change with caution and respect. Once they decided
that a tactical change was necessary, they pursued it with the knowledge that
several factors had to be changed in order for the doctrinal change to have the
desired effect. For example, this understanding of the breadth of change
accounts for their great respect for training: no tactical concept was considered
workable unless the army could apply the concept. The Germans always remained
very conscious of their army’s ability to perform. An army that adopts
tactical doctrine that it cannot apply will greatly multiply its misfortune. The
Germans recognized the considerable training effort that their tactical changes
required. Only by a great devotion to training were they able to develop high
standards of execution which made their doctrine successful and which earned
a great reputation for their army.
In developing doctrine, the Germans always considered another critical factor,
the enemy. Unlike Nivelle, who unfortunately acted as if the success of his
plans were utterly independent of the existence of his enemy, the Germans
respected their enemies. The German consideration of the influential factors
made the application of their doctrine an art, not a science.
The tactical principles were guides for the exercise of good judgment in
unique situations, not formulas to eliminate the need for good judgment. While
the various drills in the use of specific weapons and basic procedures were
ingrained in the Imperial German Army through thorough training and repetition,
the application of these techniques in the unique conditions of a battle
was not done in a rigid fashion. The tactician was an artist who applied force
according to the particular conditions of the terrain, the enemy, his own force,
and his mission, using his own best judgment. Specific combat techniques or
habits must be learned through rigid training so they can be repeated in a
consistent manner irrespective of conditions. But tactics is the application of a
variety of habits or techniques in combination in the unique conditions of a
specific battle. The difference between techniques and tactics is significant: to
instill techniques requires inflexibility and repetition; to develop a sense of tactics
requires flexibility, good judgment, and creativity.
The German consideration of all influential factors created tactical ‘concepts
that encompassed the total battle. The positioning of forces for either
offense or defense was based upon depth. The tactical principles themselves,
both offensive and defensive, emphasized the physical depth of the battlefield
and the engagement of the total enemy force. In their new tactical doctrine, the
Germans avoided excessive emphasis on the struggle at the forward edge,
where forces initially collided. The defensive principles discarded the rigid
belief that the defended space must remain inviolate. The enemy attack penetrated
the defended space, but the depth of the battlefield weakened the attacking
force, preserved the defender, and enhanced the defender’s success of retaliation
through counterattack. In their offensive principles, the Germans did
not aspire to achieve total destruction at the thin area of initial contact; they
used firepower and maneuver in a complementary fashion to strike suddenly
at the entire enemy organization. The offensive and defensive principles did
not regard the enemy as an impediment or irritant to the methodical seizure or
holding of terrain. The enemy force was the fundamental objective.
The process of developing principles to obtain this objective was a collective
or corporate effort. Individual talents and personalities were essential, but the
doctrine emerged in an atmosphere where ideas were discovered and shared,
not invented and arbitrarily imposed. OHL solicited ideas and experiences
from subordinate units, and this genuine interest gave the final product the
wide ownership that eased the acceptance and application of the doctrine.
There was also a remarkable tolerance of dissent within the process, but this
tolerance did not weaken the determination to succeed. Certainly the German
military leaders did not lack substantial egos, but their process of developing
tactical doctrine transcended individual egos. The German Army respected
and used talent, including that of the enemy. High rank was not a prerequisite
for talent. All large armies possess men of talent like Capt. Hermann Geyer;
few armies use such talent so efficiently.
OWL directed the talent of Geyer and others to derive principles from combat
experiences. These principles were sufficiently general to apply to a variety
of tactical conditions, but sufficiently precise and specific to insure common
understanding and unity of effort. Their flexibility was their strength, for
these carefully and accurately developed principles could be modified without
being discarded.2 Evidence from the battlefield was more respected than the
doctrine, both in development and execution Therefore, the process of deriving
the doctrine was inductive, and the application was in the same inductive
spirit. Too often on the Allied side, tactics originally derived from experiences
(either accurately or erroneously) became deductive formulas indiscriminately
deemed appropriate for any situation, despite contradictory evidence or
changed conditions. Nivelle’s offensive was a tragic example. Tactical methods
used successfully in a specific context, such as the Verdun counterattacks in
late 1916, became universal formulas for success in the spring of 1917. The
result was disaster physically and emotionally, for the formulas had been
applied with such certainty. The Germans never attributed such certainty to
their doctrine. This degree of uncertainty fostered a healthy curiosity and mental
flexibility. No evidence was rejected or ignored simply because it did no‘t
“fit” the preconceived scheme. Therefore the Germans were often more receptive
to new evidence or ideas than their Allied counterparts.
In his memoirs, Crown Prince Rupprecht expresses this warning: “There is
no panacea. A formula is harmful. Everything must be applied according to
the situation.“
For the Germans all tactical solutions were tentative: the Germans developed
tactical doctrine inductively and applied and refined it in the same spirit.
This process still demands much talent and ability, and it still requires a
deliberate search for evidence. Glib solutions do not replace hard work.
