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Starting with PQ18 in september 1942, the Royal Navy provided close escort carrier support for about half of the Russian convoys in addition to distant cover by the Home Fleet. PQ18 lost lost 11 ships while accompanied by the escort carrier Avenger and 5 more after it was withdrawn. Of 44 subsequent convoys, escort carrier provided close for 25, losing a total of only 8 out of 705 merchant ships, while the 19 convoys without close carrier support lost 21 out of 376 merchantmen.
стр 100
Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact
Paul E. Fontenoy
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U. S. Navy planes participated in the Bay of Biscay offensive during this period under the operational control of Coastal Command. When the U-boat situation along the East Coast of the United States started easing up in August 1943, the U. S. Army Anti-Submarine Command was withdrawn from antisubmarine operations. The U. S. Army Air Forces squadrons which had been operating in England were relieved by U. S. Navy Liberators. The U. S. Navy planes in England constituted Fleet Air Wing 7.
Carrier-based aircraft emerged as one of the most dangerous enemies of the U-boat during this period. The U. S. escort carriers took the offensive against the U-boat in regions outside the range of shorebased aircraft, especially in possible refueling areas for the U-boats. This offensive was remarkably successful and rendered most of the Atlantic unsafe for surfaced U-boats.
The U. S. escort carrier [CVE] operating with a screen of about four destroyers or destroyer escorts, composed a task group, assigned to antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic. The primary mission of the task group was to protect convoys while the secondary mission was to search out and destroy the U-boats. These task groups operated with the convoys between the United States and Gibraltar. That the primary mission was accomplished may be seen from the fact that 2200 ships crossed the Atlantic in the GU and UG convoys from May 1943 through December 1943 and only one ship was sunk by U-boat action.
A study of attacks made by U. S. CVE-based aircraft during this period provides some evidence that their secondary mission was also fulfilled. About 28 days were spent in U-boat waters on the average cruise and about 50 plane hours were flown per day. While in U-boat waters, one sighting was made for every 600 flying hours. Sixty of the 68 sightings studied resulted in an attack and about 40 per cent of the attacks resulted in the sinking of the U-boat. The high quality of these attacks was due in a large part to the ability of the fast CVE-based planes to surprise the U-boat and attack it while it was still on the surface. Another factor in the success of these attacks was the cooperation between the F4F fighter planes, who strafed the U-boat, and the TBF bombers.
OEG REPORT No. 51
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II
Charles M. Sternhell and Alan M. Thorndike
Operations Evaluation Group Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Navy Department
Washington, D.C., 1946
А лишний час он как бы небесполезен. Насчет же ПЛ не катило - бомбили все подозрительное, даже эсминец времен РЯВ на дне повторно рос...из Хеджонгов
